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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ration. For this reason the court seemed to feel that the new corporation
had not been brought within the exception to the general rule.
In summary, the court thus far in its decisions does not seem to give
any substantial weight to the duration of the covenant. However, the
covenantee would seem well advised to avoid a covenant that lasts for-
ever, and to limit the covenant to the lives of the parties involved, since
the court has used language in its decisions which would give it an ade-
quate peg on which to hang any future finding of unreasonable duration.
In respect to the extent of the territory the covenant is to include,
any restriction on the covenantor which is all-encompassing should be
avoided. The covenantee, of course, will want to draw up a contract
that will include the territory presently covered by the covenantee's
business and, at the same time, will include the territory the covenantee
will reasonably need protected in the future. Perhaps one means to
accomplish this is to separate the territory into various segments so that
the court, if it feels the outer limits are unreasonable, can easily enforce
the covenant as to a portion without destroying the entire contract.
The covenantee will have no guide as to whether the contract will be
in violaton of public policy. To say the court looks to the nature of the
business and the needs of the public is nebulous and of little help outside
fact situations like those ruled on in prior cases. Thus, the matter is
largely one of prediction. As a further difficulty, the court does not
always make clear in its decisions whether it looks at the reasonableness
of the covenant at the time the contract was made or at the time the con-
tract is being litigated. Finally, it should be noted that the court does
not seem to consider any one factor of reasonableness alone in arriving
at its decisions.
W. TEOMAs RAY
Landlord and Tenant-Liability of Landlord for Personal
Injuries Caused by His Failure To Repair
In a recent case from the Third Circuit," plaintiff, a social guest in
the home of a tenant, was injured as she left the premises. She sued
the landlord, alleging that, in performing his covenant to make repairs,
he negligently installed a light fixture and that as a consequence of this
improper installation she was injured. The district court gave summary
judgment for the defendant. The circuit court reversed, saying that
under New Jersey law, when the landlord undertakes to make repairs,
he is bound to perform the work in a reasonably careful manner, and for
failure to do so he will be liable in tort to one injured because of his
negligence.
'Krieger v. Ownership Corp., 270 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 199).
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-The question of liability of the landlord for personal injuries resulting
from the disrepair of the demised premises may arise in any of three sit-
uations: (1) where, in the absence of a covenant to repair, he does not
repair and one is injured; (2) where he fails to perform a covenant to
repair and one is injured; (3) where, with or without a covenant to re-
pair, he undertakes to make repairs but does the work negligently and
one is injured. -Further, in each of these situations, a question arises as
to the landlord's liability to different classes of people-for example,
tenants, guests of tenants, business visitors and strangers.
2
Where There Is No Covenant To Repair
American courts with few exceptions continue to adhere to the com-
mon law rule that where there is no covenant to repair the landlord
is under no duty to do so; therefore, they conclude that he is not liable
for personal injuries sustained by the tenant or his guests because of
the disrepair of the premises.3 The majority reasons that the duty to
repair is an incident of control; and since the tenant has control of the
premises-'including the right to admit or exclude visitors-he has the
duty to repair.4 Since the rights of the tenant's guests are ordinarily
the same as those of the tenant, those jurisdictions following the majority
view deny the guest recovery.5 North Carolina appears to be firmly in
accord with the majority.6
'This note will be limited to the question of liability of the landlord to the
tenant and to the tenant's social guests. The writer will not attempt to deal
with such things as the so-called "business visitor" rule which governs liability
for injury to an innocent third party who is on the premises at the invitation of
the tenant where, at the time of making a lease for a public or semi-public purpose,
conditions exist on the premises making them unfit for their intended purpose. As
to the "business visitor" rule see Webel v. Yale Univ., 125 Conn. 515, 7 A.2d 215
(1939) ; Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 551, 4 N.W.2d 617 (1942) ; Reese
v. Piedmont, Inc., 240 N.C. 391, 82 S.E.2d 365 (1954) ; Prosser, Business Visitors
and Invitees, 26 MiNN. L. REv. 573 (1942).
8 Uhlig v. Moore, 265 Ala. 646, 93 So. 2d 490 (1957); Penna v. Stewart, 78
Ariz. 272, 278 P.2d 892 (1955) ; Farber v. Greenberg, 98 Cal. App. 675, 277 Pac.
534 (1929); Newman v. Golden, 108 Conn. 676, 144 Atl. 467 (1929); Clerken
v. Cohen, 315 Ill. App. 222, 42 N.E.2d 846 (1942) ; Richmond v. Standard Elk-
horn Coal Co., 222 Ky. 150, 300 S.W. 359 (1927) ; Bushman v. Bushman, 311 Mo.
551, 279 S.W. 122 (1925); Goodall v. Deters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E. 443
(1929); Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); PRossER, ToRTs
§ 80 (2d ed. 1955) ; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947) ; RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs §§ 355, 356 (1934).
' Penna v. Stewart, 78 Ariz. 272, 278 P.2d 892 (1955) ; Brooks v. Peters, 157
Fla. 141, 25 So. 2d 205 (1946); Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571
(1951).5 Uhlig v. Moore, 265 Ala. 646, 93 So. 2d 490 (1957); Rendall v. Pioneer
Hotel, Inc., 71 Ariz. 10, 222 P.2d 986 (1950); Clerken v. Cohen, 315 Ill. App.
222, 42 N.E.2d 846 (1942) ; Mahnken v. Gillespie, 329 Mo. 51, 43 S.W.2d 797
(1931); Corcione v. Ruggiere, 139 A.2d 388 (R.I. 1958); Oliver v. Cashin, 192
Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); RESTATEMENT, ToRTS §§ 355, 356 (1934); 52
C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 418 (1947).
Robinson v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 732, 94 S.E.2d 911 (1956) ; Harril v. Sinclair
Ref Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945); Mercer v. Williams, 210 N.C. 456,
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This view, however, has not gone without criticism. Several writers
have felt a need for protecting the large and ever-increasing "tenant" seg-
ment of our population by placing on the landlord a duty to repair.7 Sev-
eral factors have led to this view, among them the following: greater
mobility of population resulting in greater use of the short-term lease,
changes in construction principles necessitating larger financial outlays
for repairs, and increased urbanization causing concentration of people
in one dwelling. 8  The duty to repair has been placed on the land-
lord primarily through legislation. Such legislation has tended to fall
into three basic classes: (1) statutes requiing the landlord to re-
pair and imposing a penalty for his failure to do so ;9 (2) statutes re-
quiring the landlord to repair and providing that if he fails to do so the
tenant may deduct the cost of repairs from the rent or terminate the con-
tract;i1 (3) statutes requiring the landlord to repair and imposing tort
liability for personal injuries arising because of his failure to do so." The
courts are not in agreement as to whether statutes of classes (1) and (2)
place tort liability on the non-repairing landlord. Thus, of the jurisdic-
tions having a class (1) type statute, some hold that the common law
has been abrogated by the statute and that the landlord is liable for
negligent failure to repair,.2 while others hold that, even though the land-
lord has the duty to repair, he is not liable for personal injury.' 3 Those
jurisdictions having a class (2) type statute uniformly hold that the
landlord is not liable for personal injuries arising from violation of his
statutory duty.' 4  Of course, in those jurisdictions having a class (3)
type statute the courts hold that the landlord is subject to liability for
187 S.E. 556 (1936); Williams v. Strauss, 210 N.C. 200, 185 S.E. 676 (1936);
Salter v. Gordon, 200 N.C. 381, 157 S.E. 11 (1931); Hudson v. Singleton Silk
Co., 185 N.C. 342, 117 S.E. 165 (1923); Fields v. Ogburn, 178 N.C. 407, 100 S.E.
583 (1919).Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958) ; 1 AmERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (Casner ed. 1952); Comments, 41 GEo. L.J. 115
(1952), 62 HAv. L. REv. 669 (1949).8 Ibid.
'CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 19-343, -344 (1958) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 413.66,
.108 (1949); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 144 §§ 66, 89 (1957); MicH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5.2843, .2873 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:7-1, :11-3 (1940); N.Y. MuLT.
DWELL. LAW § 78; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.06, .28 (1957).
0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1941; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 42-201 (1947); N.D.
REv. CODE § 47-1612 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 32 (1954); S.D. CODE§ 38.0409 (1939).
11GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-111, -112 (1937); LA. CIV. CODE A NN. art. 2693
(1952); LA. REv. STAT. § 9:3221 (1951).
" Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128 (1925); Michaels v. Brook-
chester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).8 Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 169 At. 912 (1933); Johnson v. Carter,
218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934).
"Armstrong v. Zibell, 98 Cal. App. 2d 296, 219 P.2d 812 (1950); Dier v.
Mueller, 53 Mont. 288, 163 Pac. 466 (1917) ; Staples v. Baty, 206 Okla. 288, 242
P.2d 705 (1952).
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personal injuries arising from his failure to repair.15 It appears that a
few jurisdictions, without the aid of a statute, have imposed a duty on
the landlord to exercise due care in keeping the premises reasonably
safe and have held him liable for injuries resulting from the breach of
this duty. 16
Breach of Covenant To Repair
Most American writers say that the majority of Amercian jurisdic-
-tions hold, in accord with the common law rule, that where the landlord
covenants to repair but fails to do so he will not be held liable for per-
sonal injuries arising from such failure.' 7 Courts adhering to this view
hold that the landlord is not liable in tort or in contract.' 8 The reason
for denying recovery in tort is generally that the mere reservation of a
right to enter to make repairs does not in itself give the landlord the
degree of control necessary for imposing a legal duty.' The same courts
conclude that no contract liability for personal injuries arises because
such damages cannot be said to have been fairly within the contempla-
tion of the parties at the time that they entered into the contract.2 0
Thus, the only cause of action is one arising in favor of the tenant for
breach of the contract with damages limited to the cost of repairs or the
depreciation in the value of the property.2' Since the landlord is not
liable in tort or contract for personal injuries, it follows, and the courts
adhering to this view so hold, that those persons other than the tenant22
"Kleinberg v. Lyons, 39 Ga. App. 774, 148 S.E. 535 (1929).
"Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 53 N.J. Super. 336, 147 A.2d 572 (1958);
Skupienski v. Macy, 27 N.J. 240, 142 A.2d 220 (1958) ; see also Neilson v. Barclay
Corp., 255 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
172 HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 27.16 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (2d ed.
1955); Note, 10 N.C.L. REv. 397 (1932).8 Willis v. Snyder, 190 Iowa 248, 180 N.W. 290 (1920) ; Murrell v. Crawford,
102 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 561 (1917) ; Huey v. Barton, 328 Mich. 584, 44 N.W.2d 132(1950) ; Lahtinen v. Continental Bldg. Co., 339 Mo. 438, 97 S.W.2d 102 (1936) ;
Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931) ; Timmons v. Williams Wood
Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1931) ; Note, 10 N.C.L. REv. 397 (1932).
Cavalier v. Pope [1906] A.C. 428.
" Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931) ; Timmons v. Williams
Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (2d
ed. 1955); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947).2 Lahtinen v. Continental Bldg. Co., 339 Mo. 438, 97 S.W.2d 102 (1936);
Arnold v. Clark, 45 N.Y. Super. Ct. (13 Jones and S.) 252 (1879) ; Timmons v.
Williams Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932); 2 HARPER &
JAmES, TORTS § 27.16 (1956) ; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947).
'I Murrell v. Crawford, 102 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 561 (1917); Arnold v. Clark,
45 N.Y. Super. Ct. (13 Jones and S.) 252 (1879); Timmons v. Williams Wood
Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS§ 27.16 (1956); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947).
2' The scope of the term "tenant" is not readily ascertainable from the cases.
Strictly construed, "tenant" does not include members of the lessee's family, and
some cqurts so hold. Timmons v. Williams Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162
S.E. 329 (1932); Cavalier v. Pope, [1906] A.C. 428. Other courts have included
the family within the scope of the term. Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652,
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injured because of the disrepair are also precluded from recovery.2
North Carolina is in accord with this view. In Jordan v. Miller,24 where
the landlord breached a covenant to repair and an employee of the tenant
was injured because of the disrepair of the premises, the court said that
a tenant, his family, servants, or guests personally injured because of a
defect in the premises, existing because of the landlord's failure to comply
with his agreement to repair, may not recover indemnity from the land-
lord, since such damages are too remote and cannot be said to be fairly
within the contemplation of the parties. 25
It appears, however, that non-liability is by no means the prevailing
view in this country. On the contrary, an increasing number of juris-
dictions have come to hold the landlord liable in tort or in contract for
personal injuries resulting from his breach of a covenant to repair.
Generally these courts hold the landlord liable in tort on the theory that
his duty to act is fixed by the contract. 2 However, even among th
courts which hold the landlord liable for personal injury on a torf
theory, there is no uniformity as to the requisites of such action. Thus,
some courts hold that in order for a duty to be imposed on the landlord
the contract must be such that he promises to keep the premises safe.27
One court holds that the agreement must be one to make specific repairs
and must be supported by consideration. 28 It is usually held that in
109 So. 585 (1926); Fried v. Buhrmann, 128 Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935).
As the text indicates, the distinction is of no practical consequence in this situation.
" Huey v. Barton, 328 Mich. 584, 44 N.W.2d 132 (1950) ; Timmons v. Williams
Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932); Cavalier v. Pope, [1906]
A.C. 428; PROSsFaR, TORTS § 80 (2d ed. 1955).
2,179 N.C. 73, 101 S.E. 550 (1919).5 Accord, Moss v. Hicks, 240 N.C. 788, 83 S.E.2d 890 (1954) ; Leavitt v. Twin
County Rental Co., 222 N.C. 81, 21 S.E.2d 890 (1942) ; Tucker v. Park Yarn Mill
Co., 194 N.C. 756, 140 S.E. 744 (1927).
" Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1957); Col-
lision v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059 (1919) ; Singer v. Eastern Columbia,
Inc., 72 Cal. App. 2d 402, 164 P.2d 531 (1945); Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn.
398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935); Alaimo v. Du Pont, 4 Ill. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583(1954) (employee); Warebury v. Riss & Co., 169 Kan. 271, 219 P.2d 673 (1950)(workman's compensation); Cornelio v. Viola, 161 So. 196 (La. App. 1935);
Patten v. Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 AtI. 375 (1914) ; McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md.
1, 113 A.2d 95 (1955); Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 129 N.E. 443 (1921);
Keegan v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 129 Minn. 496, 152 N.W. 877 (1915);
Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935) ; Fried v. Burhmann, 128
Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935) ; Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140
A.2d 199 (1958) ; Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 180 Pac. 510 (1919) ; Mer-
chant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916) ;
Pollack v. Perry, 217 S.W. 967 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), rev'd on other grounds,
235 S.W. 541 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921) ; Johnson v. Dye, 131 Wash. 637, 230 Pac.
625 (1924); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914).
" Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Alaimo
v. Du Pont, 4 Ill. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1954) ; Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass.
249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921) ; Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 180 Pac. 510 (1919);
Lommori v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 63 N.M. 342, 319 P.2d 949 (1957) (dictum).
"8 Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935).
1960]
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6rder for the landlord to be liable he must have notice of the disrepair
and have a reasonable time in which to correct it.29  On the other
hand, some courts hold that the landlord has a duty to make a reason-,
able inspection80 The reason usually given for imposing tort liability
is 'that by a covenant to repair the landlord reserves control of the
premises for that purpose and that such reservation of control is sufficient
basis for imposing a legal duty to repair.31 It is suggested that the
courts would be on firmer ground if they simply stated the policy reasons
for holding the landlord. 2  Indeed, most courts fail to mention either
control or policy, simply saying that the landlord's duty to act is fixed by
the contract, and, applying general negligence principles, hold him
liable 33 Thus, in a Connecticut case where the landlord breached his
covenant to repair and the tenant was injured because of the disrepair
qf the premises, the court held the landlord liable saying that the covenant
ipnposed a duty on him to exercise a certain degree of care to avoid
ipjury to others. The court stated that this duty arises where one is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that any-
one of ordinary sense who did think would at once know that if he
did not use ordinary care in regard to those circumstances danger of
injury to the other would result.3 4 These courts have had no difficulty
in extending the landlord's liability to the guests of the tenant, 5 though,
Alaimo v. Du Pont, 4 Ill. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1954) ; McKenzie v.
Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A.2d 95 (1955); Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 180 Pac.
510 (1919).
.. 8 Crowe v. BLxby, 237 Mass. 249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921); Glassman v. Martin,
196 Tenn. 595, 269 S.W.2d 908 (1954) ; Johnson v. Dye, 131 Wash. 637, 230 Pac.
625 (1924).
" Smith v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 13, 127 A.2d 45 (1956) ; Patten v.
Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 Atl. 375 (1914) ; Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis.
626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914). The New York Court of Appeals has relaxed the rule
of a leading case, Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931), which
hld that a covenant to repair did not impose a legal duty on the landlord, to the
extent that a covenant to repair with reservation of the right to inspect the premises
gives sufficient control to the landlord to make him liable in tort. De Clara v.
Barber .S.S. Lines, Inc., 309 N.Y. 620, 132 N.E.2d 871 (1956), 23 BROOKLYN L.
Rxv. 142 (1957).
, PRossER, ToRTs § 80 (2d ed. 1955), states that these courts indulge in a legal
fiction in saying that a covenant to repair gives the landlord control of the premises
since he does not have the right to admit and exclude visitors.
% 32 See Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958), where
the court says that, while the common law principle of non-liability for failure to
repair was suitable for the agrarian setting in which it was conceived, to adhere
to it now is to lag behind changes in dwelling habits and economic realities.
Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935) ; Keegan v. G. Heile-
man Brewing Co., 129 Minn. 496, 152 N.W. 877 (1915); Ashmun v. Nichols, 92
Ore. 223, 180 Pac. 510 (1919) ; Merchant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller,
135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916).
< - Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935).
Singer v. Eastern Columbia, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 2d 402, 164 P.2d 531 (1945);
Patten v. Bartlett, 11 Me. 409, 89 Atl. 375 (1914) ; Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass.
249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller,
135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916) (employee); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158
Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914).
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since the duty is fixed by the contract, it would seem that an argument
could be made that his duty is limited to the tenant.30
A few courts have refused to recognize a landlord's tort liability but
have held that he may be liable for personal injury in contract.37 How-
ever, the ordinary rules of contract damages are applied, i.e., the landlord
must have contemplated that personal injuries were likely to result from
the breach as a natural consequence thereof or must have been on notice
of such likelihood at the time the contract was made.3 8 Note that the only
difference in the reasoning of these courts and that of those which deny
recovery for personal injury in contract is that the latter refuse to
recognize that personal injuries may be foreseeable under the circum-
stances when the contract was made. It would seem arguable that,
since these courts apply the strict contract rules of damages, persons
other than the tenant who were injured would be barred by lack of
privity.3 9 However, such a holding should not absolve the landlord
entirely; if a third party is injured and such injury was foreseeable
at the time the contract was made, then, in the event that the tenant is
held liable to the third party in a suit for damages, the tenant's loss
should be held to have been foreseeable by the landlord and the landloid
should be held liable to the tenant in contract.
Where the Landlord Is Negligent in Making Repairs
The majority of American jurisdictions hold the landlord liable for
personal injuries to the tenant 4° or a third person 41 which are caused
by negligent repairs, whether performed gratuitously42 or pursuant to a
" For an example of a court which has recognized the existence of this problem
see Colligan v. 680 Newark Ave. Realty Corp., 131 NJ.L. 520, 37 A.2d 206(1944).
" Busick v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 91 N.H. 257, 18 A.2d 190 (1941). In
O'Neil v. Brown, 158 Ky. 118, 164 S.W. 315 (1914), the Kentucky court said in a
dictum that any action must be on the contract, and ordinarily personal injuries
are beyond the contemplation of the parties; however, under Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Exch. Rep. 941, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), if notice is given, the boundaries of
natural consequence may be enlarged.8 Busick v. Home Owners Loan Corp., supra note 37; O'Neil v. Brown, supra
note 37.3 But see Busick v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 91 N.H. 257, 18 A.2d 190
(1941), holding the landlord liable in contract to the tenant's wife. Quaere:
whether the court considered the tenant's family within the scope of the term
"tenant." See the discussion of the conflict of reasoning as to scope of the term
"tenant" at note 22 supra. At any rate, it seems that the tenant's family could be
considered third party beneficiaries more readily than could a social guest.
"'Nelson v. Myers, 94 Cal. App. 66, 270 Pac. 719 (1928); Lasky v. Rudman,
337 Mo. 555, 85 S.W.2d 501 (1935) ; Verplanck v. Morgan, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio
%,pp. 1948).
"' Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652, 109 So. 585 (1926) ; Barman v. Spencer,
49 N.E. 9 (Ind. 1898). Barrod v. Liedoff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 N.W. 289 (1905) ;
Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn*. 524, 45 S.W. 781 (1898).
"'Roesler v. Liberty Natl Bank, 2 Ill. App. 2d 54, 118 N.E.2d 621 (1954);
Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A.2d 683 (1955) ; Lasky v. Rudman, 337 Mo.
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covenant to repair.4 3 There are, however, differences in the reasoning
of the courts on this matter. North Carolina appears to be in accord
with the majority in holding the landlord for simple misfeasance once
he undertakes to repair pursuant to a covenant,44 though there is some
question whether there can be a recovery where the repairs are gratui-
tous. 45 In Hill v. Day,48 where the landlord negligently repaired and a
sub-lessee, who had no knowledge of the repairs, was injured, the Maine
court held that before one can recover for injuries resulting from negli-
gent performance of a gratuitous undertaking he must prove reliance
on a condition of safety which he believed was created by the landlord's
action. The Massachusetts court has held that if the repairs are gratui-
tously made then only the tenant can recover and he can recover only if
the landlord has been grossly negilgent.47 Still another view is that the
landlord's act must have left the premises in a more dangerous condi-
tion after the repairs than they were before the landlord acted.4 8
CONCLUSION
It appears that the majority of American jurisdictions hold that the
landlord is not liable for negligent failure to repair if there is no covenant
to repair and no statute imposing a duty on him to do so. Even if there
is a statute, most courts do not hold him liable for personal injuries
caused by the violation thereof. However, if there is a covenant to repair,
there appears to be a growing majority of jurisdictions which hold the
landlord liable for injuries resulting from the breach thereof. Also, if
the landlord does attempt to repair and does the work negligently,
the courts are almost unanimous in holding the landlord liable for in-
juries resulting to the tenant or his guest.
555, 85 S.W.2d 501 (1935); Verplanck v. Morgan, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio App.
1948).
13 Donahoo v. Kress House Moving Corp., 25 Cal. App. 2d 237, 153 P.2d 349
(1944); Barman v. Spencer, 40 N.E. 9 (Ind. 1898); Ginsberg v. Wineman, 314
Mich. 1, 22 N.W.2d 49 (1946) ; Bloecher v. Duerbeck, 333 Mo. 359, 62 S.W.2d 553(1933) ; Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934) (employee) ; Mc-
Courtie v. Bayton, 159 Wash. 418, 294 Pac. 238 (1930) (housekeeper's son).
"Livingston v. Essex Inv. Co., 219 N.C. 416, 14 S.E.2d 489 (1941).
" In Livingston v. Essex Inv. Co., supra note 44, the court said that the landlord
is not liable for personal injuries caused by defects in the premises unless there is
a covenant to repair which he negligently performs. The court, however, by way
of dictum, quotes from 16 R.C.L. Landlord and Tenant § 565 (1917), to the effect
that gratuitous repairs negligently performed render the landlord liable. The writer
has found no North Carolina holding involving gratuitous repairs.
" 108 Me. 467, 81 Atl. 581 (1911); accord, Kuchynski v. Ukryn, 89 N.H.
400, 200 Atl. 416 (1938).
,"McDermott v. Merchants Co-op. Bank, 320 Mass. 425, 69 N.E.2d 675 (1946).
" Kuchynsti v. Ukryn, 89 N.H. 400, 200 Atl. 416 (1938); accord, R.sTATE-
mENT, TORTs § 362 (1934). Contra, Roesler v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 2 I1. App.
2d 54, 118 N.E.2d 621 (1954) ; Verplanck v. Morgan, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio App.
1948).
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The North Carolina court holds the landlord liable only when he
undertakes repairs and makes them negligently. It is suggested that it
would be wise for both court and legislature to give careful consideration
to the social and economic conditions existing in this state, particularly
its low per capita income and increasingly crowded housing conditions.
Both of these facts are so well known that they are worthy of judicial
notice, and they seem compelling reasons for revision in this area of the
law. However, it is submitted that any change, to be effective, must
impose on the landlord the duty to repair, regardless of covenant, be-
cause the tenants who need this protection lack bargaining power to
secure covenants to repair from the landlord.
JAMES Y. PRESTON
